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The Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty celebrated its sixtieth 
anniversary in 2011.
1
 The formal defense pact, which was signed on September 1, 1951 and came into 
being on April 29, 1952, bound together Australia, New Zealand and the United States. The ANZUS 
Treaty recognized that an armed attack on any one of the signatories endangered the peace and safety 
of the others. Each national government consequently pledged to maintain and develop individual and 
collective capabilities to resist attack.
2
 Although the course of events remains uncontested, the origin 
of the Treaty continues to generate considerable interest among historians. There exist a wide variety 
of interpretations and perspectives about the aims of the participants and the nature of negotiations.
3
  
 Many scholars, as well as most of the individuals involved in drafting the agreement, stress 
the importance of Australian diplomacy. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson suggested that 
America cooperated because Australia required such a security pact in order to support U.S. plans for 
a lenient Japanese peace treaty.
4
 Robert Beisner, Acheson’s biographer, broadly agrees with this 
assessment. The pact, Beisner explains, was one of the “grudgingly paid tolls on the turnpike to the 
San Francisco peace conference.”5 At the heart of these interpretations, then, is the skill of Australian 
officials, managing to convince a reluctant superpower to commit to a tripartite security pact.
6
 
Unsurprisingly, other scholars have challenged this interpretation, emphasizing that the United States 
was hardly a reluctant convert to Southwestern Pacific security. A rising Communist threat 
throughout Asia, evidenced by the onset of the Korean War, encouraged the United States to engage 
in a number of military pacts within the Pacific region, with ANZUS being just one such example.
7
  
 Much of the disagreement stems from historians’ focus on decision-making within only one 
country. Looking to one, rather than all, of the major actors involved in the negotiations distorts 
analysis of diplomacy in the region. In order to understand the origins of the ANZUS Treaty, a 
multinational approach is essential. In addition, existing accounts of events, wherever positioned 
within the historiography, tend to rely on narrowly focused explanations for the motivations of the 
key participants. The ambitions of America, Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific region were far 
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more complex than many historians have suggested. Drawing together source material from both 
sides of the Pacific and the Atlantic, this article offers four major contributions to the historiography. 
First, the origins of the Treaty reflected a compromise between the United States, Australia 
and New Zealand. Growing Cold War concerns drove America’s commitment to international 
cooperation. Although the antipodean powers obtained a security pact, the U.S. managed to secure a 
non-punitive Japanese Peace Treaty in exchange, thereby harnessing the country’s economic and 
industrial potential in the containment of Communism. This quid pro quo helped to overcome initial 
resistance in Washington to the idea of creating any such formal agreement. The ANZUS Treaty was 
limited in scope, however, consequently disappointing Australian and New Zealand ambitions for a 
more comprehensive security alliance. The agreement also ensured that the antipodean powers 
remained militarily committed to the Middle East and Mediterranean thereby complementing 
America’s wider Cold War strategy. 
Second, existing accounts concerning the origins of the U.S. commitment to Southwestern 
Pacific security largely overlook the economic rationale underlying decision-making.
8
 Washington 
sought regional cooperation to ensure the swift revival of Japan, which played an increasingly 
important role in opposing Communism in Asia following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. 
Providing security commitments to Australia and New Zealand would help to lessen antipodean fears 
about the risks of increased economic cooperation with Japan. Furthermore, closer U.S.-antipodean 
relations would place America in a stronger position from which to discuss discriminatory trading 
policies in the region, known as Imperial Preference, that could inhibit economic revival or undermine 
longer-term stability. None of this is to suggest that America simply sought to establish a profitable 
economic empire but rather that economic and military factors were interdependent.
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Third, the historiography has downplayed the importance of the Anglo-American dynamic of 
the ANZUS Treaty. As American alliance building occurred throughout the region, the transatlantic 
relationship suffered. Existing accounts of Anglo-American relations routinely downplay or ignore 
American attempts to ensure British exclusion from the ANZUS Treaty.
10
 The Eisenhower 
administration’s eventual recourse to vigorous diplomacy amongst the Treaty members ultimately 
ensured that ANZUS did not expand beyond a tripartite agreement. These insights cast much needed 
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light on the weakening of British influence in the region. Such events also complement much of the 
“declinist” literature of the post-war period, revealing the rejection of British security provision and 
the erosion of traditional economic relations in the Pacific.
11
 
Fourth, the historiography continues to simplify how ideas about race and imperialism 
influenced the decision making process. Bigotry, as well as concerns about prejudice, has influenced 
American actions on the global stage.
12
 Yet the idea of race was more than merely a motivation for, or 
deterrent to, certain foreign policy choices in the Pacific. U.S. policymakers sometimes used ideas 
about race as a tool for the advancement of their own goals. Drawing attention to the divisions 
between Anglo-Saxon and Asian peoples legitimized an ANZUS Treaty on a tripartite basis. 
American claims that British membership would create an image of a “White Man’s Club” throughout 
the Pacific, and thus damage relations with the “non-white” powers in the region, helped to excuse 
continued British exclusion, avoided problematic calls for the creation of a broader alliance system in 
Asia, and obscured more important and self-interested motivations. Public claims about the 
importance of racial concerns, albeit exaggerated or sometimes disingenuous, thus helped to sustain 
the ANZUS Treaty on a tripartite basis preferable to U.S. interests.
13
 In addition, some Australian and 
New Zealand policy-makers sought to avoid extending membership of ANZUS to Asian powers for 
reasons that were in part motivated by racial considerations.
14
  
 Taken together, these four contributions make a broader point about the geographical 
compartmentalization of U.S. foreign policy. In the Pacific, Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom enjoyed different experiences of American diplomacy. The antipodean governments 
managed to obtain their long sought after security pact. The United States’ most important European 
ally, however, saw its interests routinely marginalized. Yet economic and military cooperation with 
the United Kingdom continued in other parts of the world. The “special relationship” evidently did 
not always apply on a global basis; Washington often viewed it as relevant only in a regional sense. 
British weakness, alongside the growing reliance of Australia and New Zealand on American power, 
allowed successive U.S. administrations to pursue American diplomacy in the Southwest Pacific 
largely as they saw fit. 
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 This article divides into four sections. The first section contextualizes the ANZUS Treaty, 
comparing and contrasting American, Australian, New Zealand and British post-war ambitions. 
Despite many similarities, the four countries sought different military and economic objectives in the 
Pacific region. Diplomacy was thus more discordant than generally assumed. The second section 
explains the emergence of the ANZUS Treaty. As the Cold War intensified, Washington sought to 
create a lenient Japanese peace treaty, which would end the occupation of Japan and harness its 
economic and industrial potential in the containment of Communism. The antipodean governments 
argued instead that a punitive peace treaty was required to prevent a resurgence of Japanese 
militarism. After considerable deliberation, the ANZUS Treaty emerged as the preferred solution to 
this diplomatic impasse. 
The third section looks at the negotiations surrounding the Treaty. Once the U.S., Australian 
and New Zealand delegations convened in Canberra in February 1951, discussions about the nature of 
a Japanese peace settlement and a security pact began in earnest. The resultant agreement benefited all 
of the participants. Yet, in assessing the terms of the Treaty, no single power obtained all of its 
objectives. The fourth section explains how the United States managed to maintain a tripartite 
agreement in the face of sustained opposition from Britain and, to a lesser extent, Australia and New 
Zealand. The United States continually legitimized British exclusion from ANZUS by claiming that 
British membership would establish a “White Man’s Pact” in the Pacific and would do significant 
damage to U.S. relations with key Asian allies. Such justifications, however, rarely drove policy. U.S. 
reluctance to expand ANZUS centered on fears that British membership would lead to a broader 
Pacific security pact that would extend American commitments in the region and do so at 
considerable cost. 
 
Pacific Diplomacy 
Despite many similarities, America, Australia and New Zealand, and the United Kingdom sometimes 
sought different military and economic objectives in the Pacific region in the post-war period. The 
following three subsections compare and contrast these countries’ competing international ambitions, 
which help to shed light on the subsequent course of U.S. diplomacy.  
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The United States of America 
Following the end of the Second World War, Australia assumed a growing importance in American 
thinking. An internal policy document from the State Department reveals that it was a “fundamental” 
objective to “maintain and strengthen the close ties of friendship between the two countries” 
established during the Second World War. Australia, the document noted, occupied an “important 
geographical position” with a people “whose way of life and whose political ideology is similar to our 
own.”15 The relationship nevertheless suffered some tensions. Under the government of Ben Chifley, 
the Australians had assumed a role that was sometimes troublesome for U.S. interests especially 
within the United Nations.
16
 Policy disputes marked relations during 1945-49, and Canberra’s 
insistence of pursing an “unpolarised line in foreign policy” irritated Washington.17 Nevertheless, at 
least in the assessment of the State Department, the Australians could be “generally counted on to 
vote on our side.”18 Australia had evidently secured a position of importance to the U.S. government 
well before the “loss” of China and the onset of the Korean War. Indeed, as the Cold War began to 
polarize international relations more keenly, the role of such “third actors” was of increasing interest 
for U.S. policy-makers.   
 Economic factors, often downplayed by existing accounts, also help to explain this growing 
interest in cooperation with Australia. The Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, of which Australia 
was a signatory, meant that the U.S. dollar functioned as the pivot of the global exchange system. All 
signatories pegged their currencies to the U.S. dollar on the assumption that a fixed parity system 
would stabilize international trade and, in turn, temper the violent nature of international relations.
19
 
Yet persistent dollar deficits, alongside the continuation of tariff protection, complicated this new 
economic order.
20
 Australia possessed an adverse balance of dollar payments and was unwilling to 
forego the trading advantages it enjoyed as a member of the British Commonwealth.
21
 Nevertheless, 
the State Department recognized the growing economic importance of Australia in the Southeast 
Asian region and to international trade more broadly.
22
 This argument complements recent research 
concerning the origins and implementation of the Truman administration’s national security 
objectives as enunciated within NSC-68. The massive rearmament program endorsed by NSC-68 
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reflected concerns about ensuring the survival of the nascent global economy, an essential component 
of post-war U.S. prosperity, as well as containing the Communist threat.
23
 
Equally important, interest in Australia reflected broader geostrategic shifts. The stability and 
reconstruction of Europe was America’s primary goal at the end of the Second World War. As 
relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, however, the situation in the Pacific became more 
important. Domestically, there existed a growing fear about the threat of a global Communist 
conspiracy, which was encouraged by revelations about the extent of Soviet espionage throughout the 
Western world. The Soviet Union’s explosion of an atomic bomb in August 1949, believed by many 
to reflect the success of Soviet espionage, catalyzed such anxieties and shattered America’s atomic 
monopoly. The subsequent defeat of nationalist forces in China in the following month further 
encouraged American fears of a global Communist threat.
24
  
The ascension of Mao Zedong and the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
increased U.S. interest in Asian security. For instance, the Truman administration now began to 
increase its material support for France in its war inside Indochina because France was now presumed 
to be fighting a Communist supported enemy and thus preventing further Communist expansion.
25
 
The Korean War, deemed by the Truman administration as an act of flagrant Communist aggression, 
fuelled growing U.S. concerns about the Communist threat. As such, the idea of a broader Pacific 
security pact became increasingly attractive to U.S. policymakers.
26
 John Foster Dulles, appointed by 
Truman in 1950 to negotiate a Japanese peace settlement and the subsequent terms of the ANZUS 
Treaty, would even go as far to suggest that what was required was a “Pacific NATO” to combat the 
growing menace of Communism throughout the region.
27
  
Japan therefore came to assume a position of extreme importance in U.S. strategic planning. 
Senior U.S. policy-makers concluded that if Japan fell into the possession of the Soviet Union, the 
Communist bloc would harness its economic and industrial might and threaten American stability and 
interests throughout the region.
28
 Thus NSC 13/2, delivered on 5 April 1949, emphasized that Japan 
would be treated as an ally rather than an occupied power. This approach would undermine Soviet 
propaganda, which claimed that the United States was a colonial power, and stimulate economic 
growth, thereby negating the possibility of an internal Communist takeover of power. U.S. support 
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would also ensure the revitalization of Japan’s industrial base, allowing Japan itself to play an 
important role in containing Soviet expansion.
29
  
Whilst the likes of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
in Japan, argued that the re-industrialization of Japan was unnecessary for containing Communist 
influence in the region, Mao’s victory swept away his objections. Thereafter, MacArthur, like most 
senior U.S. officials, believed that Japan would have to act as a central hub for resisting Communist 
influence in the Pacific.
30
 The Truman administration subsequently decided that such a security role 
required a Japanese peace treaty, thereby ending U.S. occupation and facilitating economic recovery. 
Creating a Japanese peace treaty on a lenient basis thus assumed top priority in Washington’s strategy 
towards the Pacific.
31
 
 
Australia and New Zealand 
The relationship between America, Australia, and New Zealand complicated progress towards a 
Japanese peace treaty. Although it is important to recognize differences between the two antipodean 
states, their positions often aligned neatly. Indeed, antipodean anxieties about a rearmed Japan 
manifested themselves into an uncooperative attitude towards the idea of a lenient Japanese peace 
treaty.
32
 From Canberra and Wellington’s perspective, it was essential to avoid a repeat of the disaster 
of 1942 when the British Army had collapsed in Singapore and America had retreated from the 
Philippines, leaving Australia and New Zealand exposed to an expansionist rival with greater military 
strength. While Australian and New Zealand forces were engaged in fighting German and Italian 
forces in Northern Africa, Japan had struck the Australian mainland in 1941 and 1942, bombing 
Darwin and sinking naval vessels in Sydney harbor with midget submarines.
33
 Within Australian 
policy-making circles, there was a sense that the United Kingdom had betrayed its obligations in the 
region. The decision of the United Kingdom and United States to pursue a “Germany first” strategy 
was hardly designed to convince policy makers in Australia and New Zealand that antipodean security 
was afforded top priority in London or Washington. The clear preference to the defense of the 
European and Middle Eastern theatres at the onset of the Cold War only soured opinion further in 
both Canberra and Wellington.
34
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Given the lack of direct security commitments to Australasia, it is little wonder that both 
Australian and New Zealand policy-makers believed that the continued occupation of Japan ensured 
regional security and prevented a repetition of the military disasters of 1941-2.
35
 The brutality with 
which the Japanese military conducted itself towards allied troops operating in the Pacific theatre, 
especially towards prisoners of war, only magnified these concerns. Successive Australian and New 
Zealand governments therefore placed the future of Japan at the forefront of their thinking.
36
 For the 
antipodean powers, throughout 1945-49, regional security concerns were therefore far more pressing 
than the broader Cold War.
37
 In sum, Australia did not wish to see a resurgent Japan that could once 
again strike southwards. Likewise, New Zealand regarded the possibility of Japanese resurgence with 
considerable apprehension.
38
 The New Zealand Department of External Affairs summarized its 
position clearly: 
 
New Zealand’s primary interest in the Japanese settlement is security…the lesson that we 
must draw from our experience is that no action we might take is in itself likely to make 
the Japanese feel goodwill for us, and any trust we put in Japanese promises or good faith 
or peaceful intentions is likely to prove misplaced. The history of Japanese preparations 
for aggression, the evidence that militarist projects won almost unanimous support of 
Japanese politicians, businessmen and workers, and the record of Japanese atrocities 
upon uniformed soldiers and defenseless civilians, makes it imperative that our primary 
aim should be to impose the most rigorous security control upon Japan.
39
  
 
American talk of harnessing the economic and industrial potential of the region, even as a means of 
ensuring collective security in the Pacific against the growing influence of the Soviet Union, therefore 
raised alarm throughout antipodean policy-making circles. 
Changing global circumstances, however, encouraged the Australian and New Zealand 
governments to re-align with their superpower ally. The collapsing influence of European colonial 
empires, coupled with rising nationalist movements in Southeast Asia, was of growing concern to 
security planners in Canberra and Wellington. As Japan returned to the Western orbit, Mao’s China, 
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which was funding insurgencies throughout Malaya and Indonesia, came to assume prominence. 
From the perspective of Australian and New Zealand strategic planners, the rise of Chinese power 
threatened a repeat of the Japanese threat of the Second World War. Given their own limited 
resources in relation to the possible external threats confronting them, securing some type of security 
alliance with an outside power was of paramount importance to both Australian and New Zealand 
policy-makers.
40
   
The antipodean governments also shared concerns about future defense provision in a rapidly 
transforming world. Although the Statute of Westminster (1931), which established legislative 
equality between self-governing Dominions and the United Kingdom, had given the Australian and 
New Zealand governments a greater say in the pursuit of their foreign policy, their failure to ratify the 
statute had meant that both had still largely followed the United Kingdom’s lead on strategic policy. 
The Second World War, however, encouraged a change of approach in both Canberra and 
Wellington.
41
 The conflict had provided a practical demonstration that the United Kingdom was 
simply unable to provide adequate defense in the region.
42
 The agreement between the United States 
and United Kingdom in 1942 to make the defense of the Pacific region the primary responsibility of 
the American government ushered in a turning point in defense policy; Australia and New Zealand 
could no longer rely solely on its defensive alliance with the United Kingdom.
43
 As such, within the 
post-war defense planning between the antipodean powers and the United Kingdom, Australia would 
take the lead in formulating such plans.
44
 A U.S. State Department assessment of antipodean defense 
policy ably captures this shift. “The impact of the war,” the document stressed, “has brought an 
awareness of the strategic dependence of New Zealand and Australia upon the U.S. for defense in the 
Pacific and of the importance of maintaining close and friendly relations with the U.S. and furthering 
cooperation between the two countries in matters connected with the Pacific area.”45 
Beyond the continuation of close relations with allied nations, Australia sought increased 
strategic cooperation with New Zealand—which came in the form of the ANZAC Pact in 1944—and 
the maintenance of security relationships with the United Kingdom. These relationships remained 
extremely close. Australia and New Zealand, for instance, were signatories to the SIGINT (signals 
intelligence, namely intelligence gathering) arrangement in the UKUSA agreement of March 1946.
46
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Such cooperation afforded antipodean policy-makers access to, and knowledge of, British and 
American strategic thinking. In exchange, however, the governments of Australia and New Zealand 
had to continue to commit military forces to the defense of the Middle East and Mediterranean. 
British policymakers saw the “front line” in any global war involving the Soviet Union in the Middle 
East and Europe and were keen to focus their resources accordingly.
47
  
The difficulties surrounding negotiations during the Colombo Conference of January 1950 
ably reflect these tensions as British and Australian representatives clashed over the strategic 
importance of British Commonwealth interests throughout the Pacific in relation to that of Western 
Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East.
48
 The British government’s refusal to accord the 
same priority to Pacific defense as it had to the Middle East and Europe did nothing to convince 
Australian policy-makers that their country would be defended in the event of a global war. As Percy 
Spender, the Australian minister for external affairs, outlined to his Cabinet colleagues, “It is above 
all becoming clear that the United Kingdom, with added commitments in the Middle East over and 
above its responsibilities to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, will have few resources to spare 
for active participation in the defence of the Australasian region.”49 
Nevertheless, traditional security relationships endured, principally because few alternatives 
existed. The Australian and New Zealand security relationship with the United States was patchy in 
the absence of any formal mechanisms for the exchange of military information, joint planning, or 
staff talks. As Peter Fraser, the New Zealand prime minister between 1940-9 candidly admitted, his 
country could hardly be expected to compel the United States into entering a security alliance with 
New Zealand. Australian efforts to convince the Truman administration to do just that had proven 
unsuccessful. Washington was simply uninterested in entering a trilateral security pact. America’s 
intensifying interest in Japan, however, would eventually present Australia and New Zealand with a 
diplomatic opportunity to achieve these goals.
50
 
 
The United Kingdom 
Successive post-war British governments found it increasingly difficult to uphold their global 
responsibilities. The Second World War had demonstrated the inability of the British Empire to 
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maintain its territorial integrity in the face of aggression, inflamed nationalist passions, and 
heightened financial difficulties. Economic challenges proved ever more problematic. Under the 
Labour government of Clement Attlee, an ill-fated attempt at currency convertibility took place, 
which, when coupled to growing gold and dollar deficits, exposed the fragility of the British 
economy. Further cuts in military spending followed, contributing to the withdrawal of military forces 
from India, Greece, and Palestine.
51
  
Whilst policy-makers in London accepted U.S. domination of strategic planning for Pacific 
defense as unavoidable, they nevertheless remained unwilling to abdicate all of their influence in the 
region. Indeed, the British government was anxious about the shifting balance of power. Reporting to 
the Cabinet in 1950, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Patrick Gordon Walker provided 
a stern warning. “Our hold over Australia’s loyalty and respect,” he noted, “will depend upon our 
capacity to show vigour and leadership in the world’s affairs.”52 The 1945-6 ANZAM (Australia, New 
Zealand and Malaya) understanding serves as an important example of growing antipodean 
independence. Although never a formal defense treaty, there followed Staff Talks between Australia, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom and informal interchanges of assessments, and defense 
preparations in the Pacific region were undertaken.
53
 Crucially, the ANZAM understanding accepted 
that Australia had a “special role” in the region: “In war, Australia would accept responsibility in 
conjunction with the United Kingdom and New Zealand for overall direction and control of 
operations (other than home defense) in ANZAM region.”54  
The British government had therefore accepted that Australia would now lead British 
Commonwealth strategic planning in the Southwest Pacific.
55
 Nevertheless, British policy-makers still 
believed that they had legitimate interests in the region and such perceptions were at the heart of many 
of the difficulties within U.S.-UK and UK-Australian-New Zealand relations in the forthcoming 
years.
56
 Senior British ministers were especially concerned about expanding American influence in 
the region and the impact this would have on the antipodean powers. “We cannot ignore the danger 
that Australia,” Gordon Walker warned, “will be drawn into the American orbit of civilisation.”57 
For British policy-makers, however, Pacific security remained a secondary concern, lagging 
behind the restoration of post-war Europe, defending the Middle East, and ensuring the continuation 
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of Anglo-American cooperation.
58
 During transatlantic discussions about the possibility of a Pacific 
security pact, the British made it clear that they attached primacy to the defense of Europe and the 
Middle East, and wanted to maintain the Australian and New Zealand commitment to the latter 
region.
59
 The Middle East was, in the minds of most British strategists, to be the first line of defense 
against the Soviet Union. This was due to its large oil reserves, its proximity to the Soviet Union, and 
its value as a buffer to Communist advances into both the Mediterranean and Africa.
60
 A more hostile 
and global Cold War, however, would encourage both London and Washington to look more closely 
at the Pacific and consider closer cooperation with Australia and New Zealand.   
 
Explaining ANZUS 
Following the end of the Second World War, both the British and the American governments located 
their immediate interests in the European and Middle East theatres.
61
 Analysts in both countries, 
however, began to suspect that the Soviet Union was responsible for instigating a number of 
nationalist risings throughout the Pacific region. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency noted that the 
USSR recognized the immediate advantages of denying the West access to Southeast Asia as it was 
currently the principal Western source for natural rubber and tin as well as a secondary source of 
petroleum. It was also a major source of food for India and Japan. The Western powers would 
therefore have serious problems adjusting to the loss of such supplies in the event of a Communist 
takeover in the region.
62
 
The Malayan Emergency of 1948, which developed into a lengthy guerrilla war fought 
between British Commonwealth armed forces and the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party, 
stoked suspicions in London about Soviets intentions. Whilst of the opinion that the economic 
weakness of the Soviet Union would deter Soviet leaders from launching a war against the West until 
the mid-1950s, British security planners believed that Soviet interference globally would persist and 
thus continue to damage British national interests.
63
 Indeed, the potential loss of Malaya’s dollar 
earnings would be a severe blow to the UK and thus indirectly to the U.S., while the consequent 
impact to strategic materials and balance of payment positions of the NATO countries would damage 
plans for NATO’s armament.64 
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The possibility of victory for the Communists in China heightened such concerns. The British 
Joint Intelligence Committee concluded that without preventative action and substantial material 
support, the countries of Southeast Asia might fall under Communist control.
65
 Senior elements within 
the British government were evidently early advocates of the Domino Theory that would subsequently 
inform U.S. grand strategy in Indochina. Events in Southeast Asia subsequently took on much greater 
importance for British policy-makers. Continued UK military involvement in suppressing Communist 
insurgents during the Malayan Emergency testifies to this shift in thinking.
66
 Yet for American policy-
makers, there was still considerable reluctance about direct military engagement in the region. There 
was even less enthusiasm for the creation of some Pacific security pact. Political and economic 
concerns continued to inhibit involvement. As Acheson publically stated in May 1949, “As I have 
taken pains to make clear on several occasions, the United States is not currently considering 
participation in any further special collective defense arrangements other than the North Atlantic 
Treaty.”67  
Events in Korea, however, had a profound effect on U.S. thinking. The surprise of the North 
Korean invasion of the South in June 1950 caught the intelligence services of both the United States 
and United Kingdom unaware, invoking memories of Pearl Harbor for some American analysts.
68
 The 
response was a U.S. led United Nations “Police Action” under MacArthur. The situation confronting 
MacArthur was challenging. South Korean forces were retreating in disorder and the South’s capital, 
Seoul, had fallen to the North. The remnants of the South Korean army, along with the reinforced UN 
contingent, soon became penned into the Pusan Perimeter, the southeastern corner of Korea, 
surrounded by their North Korean foes. At this stage of the war, defeat to Communist forces seemed 
likely. MacArthur’s spectacular counterattack, via an amphibious landing at Inchon on September 15, 
1950, reversed the situation. By the end of the month, the northern forces had retreated across the 38
th
 
parallel.
69
 
MacArthur soon overplayed his hand as UN forces pursued the North Koreans across the 38
th
 
parallel and moved towards the Yalu River. MacArthur misread the likely response of the PRC and, 
after an earlier attack by Chinese “volunteers” in October, there followed a full-scale assault against 
UN forces on November 25. Having downplayed the possibility of PRC intervention to his political 
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masters in Washington, MacArthur now declared that the United States faced “an entirely new war.” 
Indeed, significantly outnumbered by PRC forces in November and December, the UN swiftly 
retreated, allowing Seoul to fall once again. On December 16, President Truman declared a “national 
emergency” which “require[d] that the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of this country be 
strengthened as speedily as possible to the end that we may be able to repel any and all threats against 
our national security.”70 By the end of December, it appeared as if Communist forces would drive the 
UN from the Korean peninsula. As one military historian has noted, an “American Dunkirk 
loomed.”71 By the end of February, under the direction of General Matthew Ridgeway, a semblance of 
stability had returned to the war. Nevertheless, given the turn of events, Acheson justifiably termed 
the unfolding drama as “December Despondency” in his memoirs.72  
Such traumatic events catalyzed the Truman administration’s efforts to construct an integrated 
national security apparatus. Only following the surprise of the Korean War, for instance, did the 
United States establish a centralized signals intelligence organization, namely the National Security 
Agency (NSA). America’s European policy also evolved as the United States began to hasten its 
efforts to strengthen the NATO alliance, which would even see Secretary Acheson begin to push for 
the rearmament of West Germany. Events in Korea further helped to convince American policy-
makers of the urgency of settling the Japanese peace treaty in order to buttress the containment of 
Communism.
73
 
Although encouraging the United States to look for strong and reliable regional allies within 
the Pacific to oppose Communism, and convinced that the Communist victory in China could 
precipitate a domino-like effect throughout the region, there remained strict limits to American 
commitments in the region.
74
 For example, Washington repeatedly rebuffed lobbying from Australian 
and New Zealand officials to establish a formal Pacific security pact.
75
 There were nevertheless subtle 
shifts in American thinking towards the idea of entering into limited agreements with regional powers 
for upholding U.S. security interests.
76
 
Japan was at the heart of U.S. strategic planning in Asia as it was the only state in the region 
to possess the industrial means, labor resources, and strategic location with which to act as the 
primary defensive hub in the Pacific.
77
 Events in Korea had provided a timely reminder of Japanese 
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utility as it served as a base for supplying UN forces.
78
 U.S. intelligence assessments argued that for 
all of these reasons, “Japan’s ultimate political alignment will be a decisive factor in the balance of 
power in the Far East.”79 Consequently, Japan would “unquestionably be one of the primary targets of 
the Soviets” in any future war.80 Washington’s top priority thus became the creation of a Japanese 
peace treaty, which would end the occupation of Japan and begin to harness its economic and 
industrial potential in the containment of Communism.
81
  
Central to achieving this outcome was a peace treaty that stipulated lenient terms. Dulles, the 
principal American negotiator, looked to draft a “treaty which invoked the spirit of forgiveness to 
overcome the spirit of vengefulness.”82 Indicative of this leniency was Acheson’s suggestion that 
Japan should pay no reparations to the victims of its wartime actions.
83
 Finalizing the terms of a 
Japanese peace treaty nevertheless remained a complex task. The Japanese instruments of surrender 
contained the signatures of 11 other powers, including both the United Kingdom and Australia as well 
the Soviet Union. A preliminary peace conference established in 1947 further complicated matters by 
mandating that any final peace treaty would require the approval of a two-thirds majority. Given the 
Cold War context, the United States was prepared to press ahead with a peace treaty that excluded the 
Soviet Union.
84
 
As the State Department began to gauge the likely reaction of its allies to a non-punitive 
treaty, opposition quickly became apparent. Whilst the British government had previously pressed the 
Truman administration to create a Japanese peace treaty, it was unhappy with the current American 
proposals for a mixture of strategic and economic reasons.
85
 American plans seemed to suggest that 
Japan would enjoy unsupervised economic redevelopment, which risked aggression in the future in 
the absence of any safeguards. In addition, the American proposals suggested that Japan should pay 
no reparations to the victims of its actions. Retaining close links with numerous British 
Commonwealth states that had been the direct victims of Japanese behavior encouraged London to 
demand that some reparations had to be paid.
86
 Furthermore, Japan had been a major pre-war 
competitor for British commerce and enterprise throughout Asia. The United Kingdom had benefited 
from the void left by the collapse of the Japanese Empire throughout Southeast Asia after 1945. 
American insistence that Japan could not trade with the PRC, however, would force Tokyo to look 
16 
 
towards Southeast Asia for commercial opportunities and markets presently dominated by the United 
Kingdom.
87
 
London now sought to create its own Japanese peace treaty, which deeply concerned 
Washington. Dulles, special consul to the president and, in large measure, the man negotiating the 
terms of the proposed treaty, was skeptical. He believed that a British draft would “not adequately 
take account of what the United States believes to be its vital interests in this area.”88 Although united 
by a desire for security in the region, the major powers evidently parted company over how best to 
achieve this objective. International wrangling proved corrosive. Dulles believed that the British 
government was encouraging the Australians to take an antagonistic line towards the Japanese peace 
treaty.
89
 Such suspicions were accurate as the British were working closely with their Commonwealth 
partners in opposing American influence over the Japanese peace treaty.
90
 American interests 
nevertheless largely won through as British policy-makers constantly saw their advice rebuffed during 
the negotiations over the Japanese Peace Treaty.
91
 The U.S. attached great importance to creating a 
peace treaty on its own terms. Indeed, Dulles had gone as far as to gauge whether or not the Japanese 
would agree to a peace treaty that did not include the British if they continued to oppose the U.S. 
draft.
92
 
Australia and New Zealand’s position concerning Japan requires clarification. The Australian 
government stubbornly argued that any peace treaty had to prevent a resurgence of Japanese 
militarism. In the judgment of Australian officials, U.S. proposals would allow Japan complete 
freedom over its economic and industrial development without providing adequate safeguards against 
this economic power being utilized again for military purposes. New Zealand officials were equally 
aghast at U.S. proposals.
93
 Security concerns, however, were not the only drivers of antipodean 
diplomacy. Following America and Britain’s sustained defense of Korea, Canberra had newfound 
confidence in existing security commitments.
94
 Indeed, after successive meetings with Australian 
officials, Acheson noted that Australian demands for a security pact did not reflect “security reasons,” 
rather they served as a vehicle with which to achieve closer participation in all stages of Washington’s 
high-level strategic planning.
95
 Thus, and contrary to American expectations, when Australian Prime 
Minister Sir Robert Menzies visited Washington in late July and early August 1950, he made no 
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mention of a security pact to the president or his advisors. The prime minister instead focused his 
attention on securing financial support to implement a five-year Australian immigration and 
development program.
96
 
The Australian government was also reluctant to pursue a security pact at this juncture simply 
because Australian policy-makers had concluded that the Truman administration would reject the idea 
out of hand. New Zealand officials agreed that the subject of a formal security pact was unlikely to 
receive U.S. support and was thus not worth pursuing.
97
 Such pessimism was well founded. By the 
winter of 1950, an opportunity to discuss a Pacific security pact emerged when Dulles met with New 
Zealand representatives. Dulles’ opposition to establishing a Pacific Security Pact was evident. As 
noted by those in attendance, Dulles reasoned that there were compelling reasons why such an 
alliance was unwise: “first of all, that it gave rise to great embarrassment as to those who wish to be 
included. [Dulles] felt, moreover, that, as compared with Europe, there was lack of common 
civilization of real community of interest and trust among the diverse countries of the Pacific area.”98  
The likelihood of a full-scale Pacific security pact at this point therefore seemed remote. Yet, 
within Washington, opinion was shifting in favor of a limited security agreement between the United 
States and the antipodean powers. As Acheson noted, it was “politically necessary” to accommodate 
Australian demands concerning security cooperation, in part because the large-scale development 
program in Australia served U.S. interests and in part to garner a more cooperative position 
concerning the drafting of the Japanese peace treaty.
99
 Without Australian support for a peace treaty, 
the U.S. believed Menzies would pursue economic policies that could inhibit Japan’s economic 
revival.
 
Where Australia led, America believed New Zealand would follow. If both antipodean powers 
acted in such a fashion, it was feared that the United Kingdom would also follow suit.
100
 Such policies 
would undermine any Japanese economic revival and risked the internal stability of Japan. 
Replicating arguments about European economic recovery from the likes of Dean Acheson and 
George Marshall, Dulles argued that if Japan failed to improve its economy then it would be “futile to 
expect the Japanese to keep away from communism.”101 Security cooperation could help to overcome 
these problems. In the minds of American policy-makers, then, economic and security concerns were 
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interwoven. Indeed, the historical record offers many examples of the United States using its overseas 
security commitments to influence allies’ economic policies to its benefit during the Cold War.102 
Such concerns, which stretched across Southeast Asia, would become a recurring theme in 
future ANZUS meetings.
103
 It is difficult to exaggerate America’s concern over foreign economic 
policy. The European Recovery Program, or Marshall Plan as it came to be known, was largely 
motivated by the belief that European living standards would not improve without economic recovery. 
Without such improvement, the promises of the Communist model would become difficult to resist, 
thereby improving the chances of a Soviet victory. In spite of the enormous resources pumped into 
Europe, however, the economic situation remained precarious. During a meeting between Truman and 
president-elect Eisenhower in 1952, for instance, both men agreed the economic underpinning of the 
Western alliance was “too flimsy for safety. The slightest diminution of American aid or American 
defense spending might produce economic consequences which might seriously weaken the countries 
most closely associated with [the] U.S.”104 Eisenhower would echo such thinking once in office.105 
Japan, and increasingly Australia, were simply too important from an economic standpoint to 
ignore.
106
 
In early 1951, Australia and New Zealand continued to make their opposition towards a non-
punitive settlement known.
107
 For the U.S. government, the diplomatic impasse was clear. In order to 
gain antipodean approval for a lenient Japanese peace treaty and thus ensure the necessary two-thirds 
support from the allied occupying powers, the United States would have to guarantee that the 
revitalization of Japan’s economy would not lead to future military aggression. Progress therefore 
rested on America’s ability to provide the Australian and New Zealand governments with a suitable 
security guarantee. After considerable deliberation, the ANZUS Treaty emerged as the best solution to 
this problem. The United States government would enter into a security pact if the antipodean powers 
agreed to the Japanese peace treaty. As Acheson wrote to Dulles,  
 
the United States Government is willing to make a mutual assistance arrangement among 
the Pacific nations (Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, the United States, 
and perhaps Indonesia) … [but] the United States Government should agree to this 
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course of action only as the other nations accept the general basis on which the United 
States is prepared to conclude a peace settlement with Japan
108
 
 
Washington, both in public and private, made the link between the security pact and the successful 
conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty explicit.
109
 An interdepartmentally agreed National 
Intelligence Estimate makes this point clear: “A U.S. decision to assist Japanese rearmament would 
not cause seriously adverse reactions in any non-Communist country with major interest in the Far 
East. Australia and New Zealand, however, will require U.S. guarantees against future Japanese 
military aggression.”110  
In discussion with Carl Berendsen, the New Zealand Ambassador to Washington, Dulles 
hinted that he would discuss the terms of some type of security guarantee to both Australia and New 
Zealand during his forthcoming tour of Asia.
111
 The possibility of some type of defense pact improved 
when Dean Rusk, the assistant secretary of state for far Eastern affairs, mentioned the possibility of a 
tripartite security agreement in conversation with New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland in 
early February 1951.
112
 During subsequent meetings, Truman and Acheson hinted that the United 
States would countenance an American commitment to defend New Zealand if this would guarantee 
continued commitments to the Middle East and Mediterranean.
113
 Holland had also suggested a 
similar arrangement. The New Zealand prime minister accepted that the likelihood of a direct attack 
on his country “was remote,” and thus military forces “could best be utilized in some other theater,” 
but “New Zealand would have to know, in the event the unlikely occurred and they were attacked, 
that someone, preferably the United States, would ‘give them a hand.’”114 These events, then, form the 
background for Dulles’ visit to Canberra in February 1951 where the crucial discussions took place 
concerning the creation of the ANZUS Treaty. 
 
The Canberra Talks 
Once the respective delegations convened in Canberra in February, negotiations about the nature of a 
Japanese peace settlement and a security pact began in earnest. Spender stressed that a lenient 
Japanese peace settlement, which did not in turn provide some type of security guarantee, would 
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ultimately lead Australia to reassess its Cold War commitments. In such a situation, “Australia’s 
capacity to discharge her obligations in the event of war in Malaya as well as outside the Pacific area 
would be gravely impaired.”115 Both Spender and his New Zealand counterpart Frederick Doidge 
made good use of their respective countries’ commitments to the Middle East in persuading Dulles of 
the merits of a tripartite security guarantee.
116
 Spender went on to suggest that a tripartite security 
organization between the United States, Australia and New Zealand would provide the necessary 
security guarantees for both antipodean powers to support a lenient Japanese peace treaty.
117
 Over the 
next two days, Doidge supported Spender’s fundamental points. Antipodean endorsement for a lenient 
Japanese peace settlement would require a security guarantee from the United States.
118
  
 Dulles questioned the necessity of such an arrangement given the negligible threat of a direct 
Communist attack on either Australia or New Zealand. Spender responded skillfully, arguing that 
because the risk of a Communist attack was negligible, the U.S. could provide a security guarantee 
without fear of its use.
119
 In response, Dulles stressed that if the United States agreed to the tripartite 
security arrangement, any security pact would contain no formal pledge in the fashion of the NATO 
alliance. Moreover, the United States would not station its troops in Australia or New Zealand in 
advance of an attack upon them, as it did with NATO.
120
 Following further discussions about the 
nature of the alliance, and possible expansion of the security pact to include the Philippines, the 
representatives reached agreement concerning the general contours of the ANZUS Treaty on February 
17. There emerged a tripartite agreement without binding security terms.
121
 In assessing the terms of 
the Treaty, no single power achieved all of its objectives. Nevertheless, the resultant agreement 
benefited all of the participants. 
 From an Australian and New Zealand perspective, the agreement provided a security 
guarantee that offered assurances against resurgent Japanese militarism and against any attack from an 
outside power. Given that the New Zealand government believed that the best that they could hope for 
from the Canberra talks was some type of informal American defence commitment, the final 
agreement was therefore somewhat of a coup.
122
 Furthermore, as Canberra and Wellington well 
understood, if the United States was determined to push for Japanese reindustrialization and 
rearmament there was little that either antipodean power could do to stop it. The best way to prepare 
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for the risk that Japan would again utilize its economic power in the pursuit of military 
aggrandisement was to obtain a direct security guarantee from the United States. At the end of the 
Canberra talks, the antipodean powers have achieved this objective.
123
  
Furthermore, Australian and New Zealand policy-makers never seriously countenanced 
neutrality in the Cold War. The Soviet Union was a clear and present security threat that both states 
wished to contain.
124
 A security pact with the United States, which Doidge referred to as “the richest 
prize in New Zealand diplomacy,” would allow both antipodean powers to maintain their Cold War 
commitments.
125
 It is no surprise, then, that Berendsen concluded that the United States had “offered 
on a platter the greatest gift that the most powerful country in the world can offer to a small 
comparatively helpless group of people.”126 A security guarantee from the United States would 
therefore defend against the Soviet Union and its Communist satellites in the short-term and defend 
against potential Asian expansionism in the long-term.
127
 
Nevertheless, the agreement was limited in several regards. No mechanism emerged with 
which to secure access to other areas of U.S. strategic thinking. Specifically, the Australian 
government had sought to link the ANZUS agreement with the regular exchanges of information and 
staff officers with the U.S. defense establishment.
128
 The New Zealand government had also desired a 
greater voice in international security arrangements.
129
 The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), however, 
were unwilling to allow more service chiefs in Washington than necessary. As a general point, the 
JCS were “lukewarm” about ANZUS and they reportedly viewed it as “of no great importance.”130 
Communist agents’ successful infiltration of the Australian government did little to encourage 
cooperation. Indeed, on learning of this security breach, Washington had consequently refused to 
exchange further intelligence information with Canberra. In order to restore the intelligence 
relationship, the United Kingdom had to send a delegation from MI5, its own internal security 
organisation, to help their Australian counterparts improve internal security practices. The JCS were 
thus unlikely to welcome the possibility of exchanging further information with an outside power that 
exhibited such security lapses, especially given the persistent criticisms of the Truman administration 
and its supposed weakness against internal Communist threats.
131
 Thus the United States swiftly 
rejected Spender’s attempts in the Canberra talks to “establish a framework of formal consultation 
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and…provide a link with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”132 Efforts by antipodean policy-
makers to utilize their newfound security relationship evidently failed at this point to lead to broader 
strategic cooperation between America, Australia, and New Zealand. 
The United States certainly benefited from the agreement. It achieved the ambition of 
securing antipodean cooperation towards the American inspired peace settlement with Japan, which 
policy-makers believed to be of even greater importance throughout 1951.
133
 Dulles had also ensured 
that that the Treaty was limited in nature and scope, disappointing Australian and New Zealand efforts 
to establish integrated military planning.
134
 At no point did the Treaty guarantee joint staff talks or 
strategic planning, concessions that would turn the idea of a pact into a functioning security alliance. 
In addition, by agreeing to the ANZUS Treaty, the United States received a guarantee from both 
Australia and New Zealand to maintain their commitment to the defense of the Middle East and 
Mediterranean, areas that had come to assume great importance within U.S. strategic thinking, and to 
remain active the Cold War more broadly.
135
 
This outcome is not to suggest that Australian or New Zealand diplomats had been blindsided. 
Since coming to office, Menzies had made it known that he wanted Australia to take a more active 
role in the Cold War, and refrain from the “busy-body” approach adopted by the preceding Chifley 
government. He wanted Australian forces to be committed to a region where they would actually have 
an impact on the outcome of any future global war. For Menzies, committing Australian forces to the 
defense of the Middle East and Mediterranean made strategic sense.
136
 Likewise, by the beginning of 
1950, New Zealand officials had concluded that a third world war instigated by the Soviet Union was 
increasingly likely. One appraisal of the world situation composed by Berendsen mirrors the more 
damning indictments of Soviet intentions that are traditionally associated with the likes of John Foster 
Dulles and Paul Nitze. Berendsen believed that the Soviet Union sought “domination of the world” 
and was led by “international gangsters.” The world situation was, he concluded, “a struggle between 
two totally incompatible and irreconcilable theories of human relations and human government.”137 
The New Zealand Joint Planning Committee was equally clear when it claimed that the “only possible 
enemy in the foreseeable future is the Soviet Union acting with the assistance of her European and 
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Asiatic satellites.”138 Both antipodean states therefore were committed to fighting the Cold War and 
the ANZUS arrangement complemented this ambition.  
Beyond ensuring broader security interests, the U.S. enjoyed several economic benefits from 
the successful conclusion of negotiations. ANZUS complemented a broader attempt by the Truman 
administration to strengthen its economic position throughout Southeast Asia. The U.S. State 
Department was already concerned about the exclusive nature of economic cooperation between the 
United Kingdom and the two antipodean powers. The former Dominions’ temporary wartime bulk 
purchase agreements, aspects of which continued for several years after hostilities had ended, were 
especially troubling. Such agreements, by channelizing trade, threatened to undermine the structure of 
international trade and impede Japanese revival. While America would not break these historic trade 
connections, the Treaty helped to build confidence in Australia and New Zealand to improve trade 
relations with Japan. In so doing, it provided an opportunity to question the imperial preference of 
commercial policies in the region, which the United States had actively sought to end since the 
Second World War.
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Indeed, before the Treaty was agreed, the State Department had stressed the need to “continue 
to point out to Australian officials the economic objections to such [trade] arrangements.
”140
 ANZUS 
provided a potentially useful platform to encourage the antipodeans to “gradually counteract the 
narrow trade concepts of the past,” thereby strengthening international trade in general and Japanese 
recovery in particular.
141
 As Clifton Webb, the New Zealand minister of justice and close confident of 
the prime minister, noted in Cabinet discussion, the creation of ANZUS meant that New Zealand 
could no longer “pound the table on the matter of imperial preference.”142 In this way, ANZUS 
respected the Truman administration’s belief that the United States could pursue economic and 
security objectives in tandem.
143
 
Yet even the United States could not obtain all that it wanted. Prior to the Canberra talks, 
Acheson instructed Dulles to negotiate a wider security pact. Dulles followed his instructions, and 
called for ANZUS to include membership for at least the Philippines. Spender and Doidge 
successfully resisted Dulles’ efforts, although both had in fact left the meeting believing that the 
Philippines was likely to be included as a founder member of ANZUS.
144
 Antipodean resistance to 
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Philippine membership reflected a mix of geopolitical, security, and racial motivations. Australia and 
New Zealand were determined to be treated as “Western” powers and were committed to play an 
important role in the Cold War. A security pact that included the Philippines would signal that both 
were in fact Southeast Asian powers and could limit antipodean ambitions of influencing U.S. 
strategy beyond the Southwest Pacific region.
145
 A pact involving Asian powers could also potentially 
drag both states into the defense of areas that had no direct bearing on their own interests.
146
 Racial 
and cultural assumptions also informed antipodean thinking. As Alan Watt, the secretary to the 
Department of External Affairs in Australia, candidly admitted in private discussions with his New 
Zealand colleagues, there were three overarching reasons why Australia desired a security guarantee 
from the United States. These were to counter against a rearmed Japan, against Communist 
imperialism in Asia, and “against Asian expansionism generally.” As the record of this conversation 
noted, “The third reason, which [Watt] agreed was the strongest, could not, however, be made 
public.”147 Race and culture, therefore, provide additional explanatory tools for understanding the 
nature of the ANZUS Treaty.  
Antipodean resistance, supported by the United Kingdom, encouraged the United States to 
forego Philippine membership and instead conclude a bilateral agreement, entitled the U.S.-Philippine 
Mutual Assistance Treaty, in August 1951. The British government certainly exerted influence over 
the final membership of ANZUS. Indeed, British opposition to a broader and more inclusive Pacific 
security pact helps to explain the exclusion of other regional powers from ANZUS. The British could 
tolerate their own omission from a strictly tripartite alliance, albeit only for the time being, but if a 
broader Asian security alliance emerged, then British policy-makers would demand membership of 
such a pact.
148
 The limited tripartite nature of the agreement therefore reflects the influence of four, 
rather than three, states. The ANZUS agreement was also of indirect benefit for British interests 
because it provided the regional security guarantees that in turn allowed both Canberra and 
Wellington to commit their forces to the Middle East and Mediterranean in the event of a war with the 
Soviet Union.
149
  
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom remained uneasy about the Treaty. Throughout the 
creation of ANZUS, the British government was excluded from the process and largely ignorant of 
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the details. British officials had made it known to their Australian and New Zealand counterparts that 
they would not “favour the idea of a Pacific defence organisation which excluded the United 
Kingdom,” but this proved to be the very result of the Canberra talks.150 As one historian has noted, 
British policy-makers did not deem Australia or New Zealand to be a “foreign country,” yet during 
the creation of ANZUS both had acted as such. The affinity of Empire and common kinship was 
limited in the face of geopolitical realities. As Doidge remarked in one cabinet session, the fact was 
“Britannia no longer ruled the waves” and New Zealand would thus have to guarantee its security 
through a pact with the United States.
151
 Spender’s assessment during the talks was also clear: 
“Australia was a principal in the area but the United Kingdom was not.”152 British objections, as 
Menzies noted to Holland, would not prevent the creation of a tripartite security pact with the United 
States.
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America had never seriously considered the United Kingdom as a key member of any future 
security pact in Asia. In contrast, the Philippines, Japan, Australia and New Zealand repeatedly 
appeared as the key states in American policy-making conversations.
154
 When Britain did feature, it 
was often regarding trading and economic practices that undermined broader U.S. geopolitical 
objectives.
155
 America largely considered the British to be of marginal importance as an ally in 
resisting Communism throughout the Pacific. As Dulles noted to MacArthur, “The United States and 
Japan are the only significant sources of power in the Pacific, we actual, they potential.”156 Such was 
the honesty, or perhaps insensitivity to British sensibilities, that both Dulles and Acheson would 
repeat this point in discussion with British officials.
157
 
Suggestions that Anglo-American differences over the creation of ANZUS were limited, or 
reflected “clumsy diplomacy and personal obstinacies,” downplay British interests in the region.158 
The British government saw its omission as detrimental to its national interests, reflecting concerns 
beyond mere self-esteem. As British policy-makers feared, exclusion meant that if ANZUS either 
materialized into a broader alliance or began to involve strategic planning, the United Kingdom would 
find itself on the outside unable to influence the course of events.
159
 British policy-makers were right 
to be concerned about their exclusion from ANZUS. By the end of 1953, encouraged by U.S. policy-
makers in forums created by ANZUS, both Australia and New Zealand re-positioned their strategic 
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planning to defend Malaya instead of the Middle East in line with growing American concerns about 
the growing threat posed by Communist forces in Southeast Asia.
160
  
During cabinet discussions, Prime Minister Clement Attlee had suggested in the face of 
opposition that ANZUS aligned with the overarching British policy to encourage allies to provide for 
their own national defense.
161
 Competing accounts and the actions of British diplomats contradict 
Attlee’s position. Lobbying of U.S., Australian and New Zealand officials in the lead-up to the 
Canberra talks to prevent their exclusion from any security pact had proven unsuccessful.
162
 Foreign 
Secretary Herbert Morrison also complained to Dulles that American public announcements about the 
negotiating of the ANZUS Treaty undermined the illusion that the British government was involved 
in the negotiations, removing even the veneer of influence. Moreover, the United Kingdom’s 
exclusion from a defense treaty with two of its Dominion powers hardly supported British ambitions 
of retaining world power status.
163
 Although on balance the antipodean powers would have preferred 
British inclusion at that time, American support was essential. Spender was therefore unwilling to see 
his designs for a security treaty scuppered by British complaints. He remained insistent throughout his 
negotiations with Dulles that British grievances concerning exclusion were groundless and should be 
disregarded.
164
 
The timing of the ANZUS Treaty also complemented important economic shifts away from 
British interests. As Australia’s goals for diversifying its industrial structure developed, the United 
Kingdom had struggled to provide the necessary capital. Australia subsequently renegotiated its trade 
relations in the 1950s and placed more emphasis on relations with the United States.
165
 Economic 
recovery throughout Asia, along with the liberalization of trading practices, weakened Britain’s 
privilege within the imperial trading system and encouraged rival markets for potential Australian 
goods and services. By the late 1960s, Japan had become a more important market for Australian 
products than the United Kingdom.
166
 In facilitating a non-punitive Japanese peace treaty, and 
providing the U.S. with a stronger political position from which to discuss discriminatory trading 
policies with the antipodean powers, exclusion from the ANZUS agreement ultimately proved to be a 
costly failure for the British government. 
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Maintaining British exclusion 
All three signatories of ANZUS had agreed to exclude the United Kingdom from membership. Of the 
three, London rightly perceived the United States to be the driving force behind this decision.
167
 
Explanations for exclusion, however, differed on either side of the Atlantic. Senior elements within 
the Labour government and the Conservative opposition believed exclusion reflected Attlee’s earlier 
decision to recognize the PRC despite American protests. Such arguments are unconvincing. 
London’s recognition of the PRC was certainly distasteful to Washington but had not undermined 
cooperation in many other areas of alliance security policy.
168
 Limited mention of the United 
Kingdom’s China policy in U.S. documentation concerning membership of ANZUS also makes such 
explanations difficult to substantiate.  
American explanations publically centered on the idea of race. U.S. officials suggested that 
British exclusion from ANZUS reflected anxieties about an “Anglo-Saxon or White Man’s Club” in 
Asia.
169
 British membership would create such a club, whereas a limited tripartite agreement would 
help to win the propaganda battle against the Soviet Union, pacify continued international complaints 
about U.S. domestic racism, and placate potential criticism from allies such as the Philippines that 
were themselves seeking a security alliance with the United States.
170
 Historians have paid a great 
deal of attention to the categorization of groups for many decades, producing a rich and diverse 
historiography concerning domestic politics.
171
 Diplomatic historians have also found race to be 
especially relevant to U.S. foreign policy in Asia during the Second World War and in the post-war 
period.
172
 In relation to ANZUS, however, historians have largely overlooked the issue.  
Concerns about race were certainly important to key U.S. policy-makers. During the 
negotiations of the Japanese Peace Treaty, for instance, Dulles was anxious that Asian countries might 
perceive U.S. policy as racist because of their exclusion from the negotiations. Such tensions could 
undermine his chances of successfully concluding a treaty.
173
 Regarding ANZUS, Dulles was 
concerned about an exclusively “white” security pact. As one memorandum makes clear, “There was 
a danger that a security pact limited to the three white Pacific nations would raise serious political 
problem for the United States in the Philippines, and [Dulles] felt that, for that reason, his 
Government might wish to ask that the Philippines be admitted as an original party.”174 This was the 
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very objective that Dulles had pursued during the Canberra Talks, albeit unsuccessfully. In addition, 
he was concerned with American race relations, both domestically and internationally, and how such 
a treaty could undermine the U.S. in its struggle against Communism.
175
 
Nevertheless, explanations for British exclusion based on race are only partially convincing. 
Onlookers would surely struggle to see the addition of Britain to ANZUS, given existing alliances 
with its three members, as “unnatural.” Moreover, the creation of ANZUS with Australia and New 
Zealand was, for all intents and purposes, a “White Man’s Club” given the “White Australia” and 
“White New Zealand” immigration policies maintained at this time.176 Furthermore, when surveying 
the documentary evidence, it is apparent that ethnic or ideological concerns were not the determining 
factors guiding American foreign policy in the region. “Race,” specifically repeated references to a 
“White Man’s Club,” was instead often utilized by American policy-makers as a diplomatic tool. 
Such terminology obscured the pursuit of American geopolitical and economic interests in the region. 
Scholars should therefore look to ideas about race to complement, rather than replace, existing 
accounts of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the ANZUS Treaty and broader security strategies 
throughout the Pacific.
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America’s decision to exclude Britain from ANZUS largely reflected two material concerns. 
The first revolved around a continued fear within the U.S. policy-making establishment that America 
could simply not afford to create a NATO style pact in Asia, which would inevitably involve a major 
contribution from the American Treasury. The election of the Eisenhower administration, which was 
determined to control rising American public expenditure, meant that without some significant 
external developments, increased spending was unlikely.
178
 The second problem was that broadening 
the defense pact could invite other European powers to manipulate the United States into defending 
their colonial possessions under the guise of fighting against Communism.
179
 As the British were 
involved in a counterinsurgency war in Malaya, which involved a contribution from Australian and 
New Zealand forces, such fears appeared reasonable. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs only accepted 
ANZUS as it currently stood because it was an essential prerequisite for gaining Australian approval 
for the Japanese peace treaty.
180
 
29 
 
 The Attlee government had sought to downplay British exclusion from ANZUS, but electoral 
defeat brought with it a reversal in policy. On October 26, 1951, Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
returned to office with a small parliamentary majority. Churchill had returned to Downing Street for 
his final premiership at the age of almost seventy-seven.
181
 It did not take long for the prime minister 
to demand membership of ANZUS. Churchill’s belief in the connection between the “Mother 
Country” and the “Dominions” was strong. Nevertheless, his actions in the Second World War, which 
had effectively left Australia and New Zealand to fend for themselves against Japanese aggression, 
had demonstrated his pragmatism in foreign policy.
182
 
As events in Asia became increasingly important to the course of the Cold War, inclusion in 
ANZUS could potentially allow the United Kingdom to exert more influence over American thinking 
in the region. In keeping with British grand strategy, close U.S.-UK relations were necessary in order 
to “guide” the United States in the struggle against Communism.183 Furthermore, Churchill had 
become increasingly worried about the likelihood of a global war, prompted by both Soviet and U.S. 
belligerency. Such concerns encouraged the prime minister’s belief that the British should play a 
major role in a broader defense treaty in the Pacific, something he would term a “Pacific Defence 
Pact,” that would include the ANZUS members, the United Kingdom, France, and several other Asian 
states.
184
 
Gaining entry into ANZUS became a priority for Churchill and consequently led to a two-
pronged diplomatic effort. The first involved directly lobbying Washington, which occurred on 
numerous occasions throughout 1951-3. The second utilized direct appeals to both the Australian and 
New Zealand governments for them to lobby the United States on Britain’s behalf.185 Thus, 
throughout his efforts to achieve membership, and in an effort to gain political leverage over the 
United States, Churchill sought to establish stronger ties with the Australian and New Zealand 
governments. Such attempts came in the form of detailed staff talks about how to uphold security 
throughout the ANZAM region in the longer-term.
186
 As the British government took greater interest 
in the region, it also sought to establish a closer security partnership with Australia and New Zealand, 
which would come in the guise of a broader Pacific security framework. Churchill envisaged that this 
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partnership would have a central machinery of control for the wider Pacific area, including Southeast 
Asia.
187
 The two-pronged approach, however, would ultimately fail.  
Both Canberra and Wellington gave Churchill’s ideas considerable thought. In April 1952, 
Holland confirmed that, “the United Kingdom must be brought in” to ANZUS.188 Menzies was also 
interested in British membership. He believed that Churchill’s ideas provided the opportunity for 
turning ANZUS into a functioning security alliance that would include detailed strategic planning. As 
the Australian prime minister suggested to his closest security advisers, British membership increased 
the likelihood of strategic planning discussions between members and would increase the level of 
importance attached to the defense of the Pacific in both British and American grand strategy.
189
 
There was considerable sympathy for Menzies’ thinking, not least from the Australian Defence 
Department. As strategic planning between Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom already 
existed within the context of ANZAM, it was illogical to replicate this within the framework of some 
future ANZUS planning that omitted the British entirely. In addition, in the event of a global war, 
Britain’s military contribution would be imperative to ensuring that Australian sea-lanes remained 
open. Finding a solution to British omission from ANZUS was therefore important.
190
  
Policy-makers in Washington, whilst less susceptible to British arguments, were thus forced 
to confront the issue of British exclusion from ANZUS early on. The first meeting of the ANZUS 
council, held in Honolulu, Hawaii from August 4-6, 1952, surrendered a considerable amount of time 
to the topic.
191
 In discussion, the Australian and New Zealand representatives raised the case for 
British membership. Such efforts perhaps revealed lingering imperial ties, but more likely reflected a 
belief that British membership would bolster chances of creating a NATO like security pact, 
introducing all of the strategic benefits this afforded. Nevertheless, the Australian and New Zealand 
delegations were more concerned with trying to convince the Americans to begin detailed military 
discussions within the framework of ANZUS. Indeed, the difficulty of securing military collaboration 
eventually sidelined discussions concerning British membership of ANZUS.  
During the talks, the U.S. rebuffed all advances for joint military planning. Efforts to enlarge 
ANZUS, and thus accrue the strategic and military planning benefits via the “backdoor,” proved 
equally futile. At the conclusion of the conference, the participants issued a joint communiqué. While 
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not strictly forbidding British membership of ANZUS, it was clear that none of the member states 
were now looking to expand membership in the immediate future. Australia and New Zealand might 
have preferred British membership, but they were unwilling to endanger the nascent Treaty to achieve 
this outcome.
192
 Policy-makers in Canberra and Wellington feared that Washington would 
misconstrue efforts to expand membership as an effort by former colonial powers to uphold their 
interests in the Pacific and Southeast Asia more generally. The United States, Australian officials 
noted, may then decide to retract their commitment to Australian defense.
193
 American objections 
towards British membership thus prevailed. 
The public communiqué issued at the end of the conference suggested that the United 
Kingdom would be permanently excluded from ANZUS. London nevertheless sought confirmation 
via sources within the New Zealand government. The response, which confirmed initial suspicions, 
left senior policy-makers seething.
194
 “What impudence to suggest that France and I suppose Portugal 
(who has interests in these waters),” Churchill wrote to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, “are 
on the same terms with Australia and New Zealand as Britain. If this point became public in either of 
these countries, I am sure that there would be a violent re-action.”195 Lord Salisbury, the minister of 
state for the Dominions, was equally disdainful, suggesting that the attitude of the Dominions was 
“deplorable” and “tiresome.”196 Exclusion from ANZUS was evidently a serious affront and many 
senior political figures perceived it to have had damaging implications for legitimate British interests 
in the region. These responses indicate that British policy-makers never saw their exclusion as merely 
a case of hurting British prestige.
197
 Instead, British policy-makers feared their continued exclusion 
from ANZUS meant that that United Kingdom had lost the ability to “guide” Western strategy in the 
region. 
 The obstacle to British membership had been largely American in nature. Yet, when British 
officials pressed their American counterparts, they only received vague excuses. Acheson repeatedly 
explained that ANZUS could not expand to include other members because it would encounter 
enormous domestic-political opposition from the United Sates Congress. In addition, an expanded 
ANZUS would appear as a “White Man’s Pact” that was “cloaking some new form of 
Imperialism.”198 These utterances ably reflect America’s use of race as a diplomatic tool in the post-
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war period. Such an explanation was a much more convenient excuse for America than justifying 
British exclusion because of lingering doubts about discriminatory trading practices between Australia 
and Britain, fears about new strategic commitments, or concerns about the costs of defending 
European colonial assets.
199
 
As a tool for cloaking real American intentions, however, the race argument was deficient. 
The British Chiefs of Staff recognized that far less altruistic reasons governed American policy. 
Mirroring the types of complaints made during World War II, the Chiefs complained that, “The 
United States desire to keep control of Far East planning in their own hands, and their own attitude 
towards ANZUS is governed by that desire.”200 Likewise, British officials in the foreign office 
complained that the American argument lacked substance. British exclusion, in their assessment, had 
little to do with the fear of creating a “White Man’s Club” and much more to do with the American 
desire to exclude the United Kingdom from strategic planning and to weaken their preferential 
economic position throughout the region.
201
 Yet, in a perverse fashion, such excuses allowed the 
British government to save face. Fairness, not weakness, appeared to explain British exclusion to 
international onlookers, which perhaps explains the persistence of this particular diplomatic excuse.  
While British ministers and officials believed they had little chance of joining ANZUS whilst 
Truman and Acheson occupied the White House, the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower in November 
1952 raised hopes that a change in U.S. policy would be forthcoming.
202
 The president’s decision to 
appoint John Foster Dulles as his secretary of state soon dashed such optimism. Dulles, disliked by 
both Churchill and Eden, had negotiated the Japanese Peace Treaty and the creation of the ANZUS 
Treaty. His conduct during both demonstrated his willingness to ignore British sensitivities.
203
 Eden 
and Churchill spoke privately with Eisenhower in January 1953, which only reinforced their concerns, 
as the president-elect appeared uninterested in the subject of expanding ANZUS membership.
204
 
Despite a change of personnel, however, the excuses remained consistent. Dulles emphasized his 
concern that ANZUS should not appear to be a “White Man’s Club” in Asia.205 
Although Eisenhower appeared uninterested in British membership of ANZUS, Churchill was 
confident he would be able to influence the president owing to their close cooperation during the 
Second World War. Throughout 1953, he redoubled his efforts to gain entry. Churchill also planned 
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to push his latest idea about the creation of a Five Power Pact—involving the U.S., Australia, New 
Zealand, Britain and France—or a broader NATO-like security arrangement for the region that would 
expand the membership of ANZUS. European powers, such as the United Kingdom and France, 
would join with Asian powers such as the Philippines, Singapore, Malaya, India and Pakistan, in a 
new security alliance.
206
 The inclusion of these “non-white” powers would help to undermine the U.S. 
racial argument, which opposed a broader security alliance that included the United Kingdom.  
Churchill, however, had fundamentally misread the foreign policy intentions of the ANZUS 
powers. In Australian and New Zealand policy-making circles, the idea of a Five Power Pact was 
unappealing as it threatened to downgrade their status vis-à-vis the United States. More worrying yet 
was the continuing Australian suspicion that British proposals were a ploy designed to destroy 
ANZUS. As Percy Spender, now Australian ambassador to the United States warned from 
Washington: 
 
I know the grand old man [Churchill], does not like ANZUS and will do his best to 
reduce it to bare bones- perhaps by putting forward the Five Power Staff Agency, and by 
seeking agreement to broad political directives- which can always be interpreted as one is 
disposed to interpret them- directed to the Staff agency. But we have achieved a special 
place in the Pacific through ANZUS and I know you will forgive me when I say, we 
must hang on to it.
207
 
 
Regardless of London’s efforts, the Eisenhower administration was also unlikely to welcome a 
broader security alliance in the Pacific. Such a commitment would require additional funding which 
ran contrary to the administration’s serious efforts to reduce U.S. public expenditure on defense.208 
Indeed, it was only following the collapse of the French in Indochina in 1954 that a real change in 
U.S. thinking concerning the region emerged. Only then would the U.S. government seriously 
consider a Pacific security pact. Although these events led to the creation of the South East Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO), even this international organization for collective defense remained 
heavily reliant on nuclear arms and many historians consider it to have been a “failed alliance.”209 
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As the United States continued to oppose British membership of ANZUS, Churchill looked 
for support elsewhere. Meeting with Menzies and Holland in June 1953, he took the opportunity to 
press his case. Churchill started the meeting with a plea that exclusion ran “contrary to United 
Kingdom interests, and was objectionable on both military and political grounds.”210 Stressing that 
relations “might be impaired in [the] future if a solution were not found to the problem of planning 
Pacific strategy,” he concluded that “in view of the difficulty of associating the United Kingdom with 
ANZUS, some wider form of Pacific pact should be considered.”211 The response was lackluster. Both 
Menzies and Holland refused to confirm whether they would support the prime minister’s proposals. 
Following further reflection in Canberra and Wellington, Churchill’s proposals received a lukewarm 
response. 
Any lingering Australian sympathies had now evaporated. Menzies made it clear that he 
would no longer allow ANZUS to be “disrupted” by the question of British admission. His foreign 
minister, Richard Casey, was also adamantly opposed to British membership. Casey resented the 
implication that the Australians required British “hand holding” in any alliance, and feared that 
pushing for a broader security pact could lead the United States to cut its existing security guarantees 
to Australia. Spender had also made a similar argument to Menzies in a lengthy note from 
Washington: 
 
I specially want to stress, if we allow anything to interfere with ANZUS, whether on the 
political or military plane, we will lose the only means we have of any effective entry 
into USA political and military thinking at a high level and the intimacy which ANZUS 
unquestionably affords us. For the first time we have got a toe hold into the councils in 
the USA which affect the world and its destiny at a high and acknowledged level through 
ANZUS. I cannot tell you how glad I am that you are resolved that we shall not 
relinquish it.
212
   
 
Australian policy-makers had now concluded that the status quo was preferable. In New Zealand, 
there was considerably more sympathy for Churchill’s plight, but progress also foundered on fears 
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that pursuing such a path would jeopardize current U.S. commitments. In the final analysis, such a 
risk was not worth taking.
213
 Sentimentality and imperial bonds were evidently unable to overcome 
geopolitical realities. 
Support for British membership within the antipodean countries continued to wane over the 
course of the year. “The ANZUS arrangement,” Menzies explained to Churchill, “has political reality 
in New Zealand and the United States as well as in Australia. It is a political fact of the first 
magnitude. In any of these countries, moves which had the effect of destroying or even weakening 
this arrangement would be liable to serious misunderstanding.”214 Familiar American excuses also 
now took root in the southern hemisphere as Australian policy-makers now began to suggest that 
British membership of ANZUS would create the impression that it was a “White Man’s Club” and 
would therefore damage relations between its members and the other Asian powers.
215
 This racial 
explanation was largely disingenuous as the Australian decision to exclude the United Kingdom from 
ANZUS had little to do with racial equality. Such rhetoric, however, served as a useful excuse. 
British representatives also encountered resistance from the New Zealand government. 
Holland, whilst more sympathetic to the British position, would not countenance alterations to the 
Treaty that could potentially undermine U.S. security commitments. Churchill’s ambition of obtaining 
Australian and New Zealand support for a Pacific security pact therefore collapsed in the absence of 
any real enthusiasm.
216
 Evidence of such discussions also tempers claims of the “ANZAC dilemma.” 
Australia and New Zealand may have felt “the pull between old habits of thought and emotion and the 
necessities imposed by geography and the present state of world affairs” but their preferences were 
sufficiently clear to lessen the difficulty of any such choice.
217
 Both the Australian and New Zealand 
governments were becoming increasingly skeptical about the benefits associated with British 
membership of ANZUS.
218
 
Despite failing to convince their antipodean counterparts, Churchill and Eden persisted in 
bilateral diplomacy with the United States. Following his orders from London, the British ambassador 
to Washington, Oliver Franks, met with American representatives in September 1953. Membership, 
he learned, was no longer a possibility for the United Kingdom. The explanations offered in defense 
of this position included fears of a “White Man’s Club,” and the consequent possibility of French 
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membership, which risked the costly expansion of ANZUS into Indochina. British hopes that 
Eisenhower’s ascension to the presidency would help them to gain access to ANZUS had proved ill 
founded.
219
 Whilst Churchill and Eden accepted that the United Kingdom could no longer dominate 
Western strategy in the Pacific, now even a marginal role eluded them. Churchill had evidently 
overestimated his country’s importance to the United States in relation to Pacific security.220 
By late 1953, Dulles had made it abundantly clear that the United States would not countenance 
the possibility of British membership of ANZUS. In a thinly veiled threat to any potential supporters, 
he made it known that if the two antipodean states continued to pursue the matter then they would do 
so at the expense of the entire ANZUS relationship. As the Australians subsequently informed the 
British: 
 
A decision was taken not to extend the membership of Anzus to include the United 
Kingdom. Mr Dulles at one stage professed readiness, if Australia and New Zealand, 
really wished it, to let the United Kingdom into Anzus. But he made it clear that if that 
happened, it would therefore be the end of Anzus as a treaty having any value to the 
three parties.
221
 
 
It is possible that the Australians had exaggerated America’s diplomatic approach in an effort to 
downplay their own interests, but such duplicity seems unlikely. The U.S. had been insistent on British 
exclusion from the very beginning and Dulles’ diplomacy was certainly in character. Even if Dulles’ 
behavior was merely an act of frustration or bravado, the fact remained that American strength allowed 
for the creation of an alliance predominantly on U.S. terms. Accordingly, a communiqué issued at the 
end of the 1953 ANZUS meeting explicitly ruled out extending membership.
222
 
America’s handling of its allies, and the issue of British membership more broadly, represents 
a subtle challenge to the existing Cold War historiography. Claims of “empire by invitation” tend to 
stress cooperation amongst alliance partners. Dulles’ diplomacy with the antipodean powers 
complicates such assumptions. Nor were such negotiations an aberration for the period or the region. 
Marc Trachtenberg has similarly shown that the U.S. could treat its allies roughly if required to secure 
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national interests. Such insights certainly challenge popular caricatures of America’s handling of the 
Atlantic Alliance and there is good reason to believe similar methods extended to the Pacific.
223
 
Reinforcing Dulles’ rough diplomacy with Australia and New Zealand, America cemented its 
preference for a tripartite agreement without formal defense ties. Following the public announcement, 
Australian and New Zealand officials made it clear to their British counterparts that they would no 
longer push for expansion. ANZUS would remain as an exclusive tripartite pact. 
 
Conclusion 
The emergence of a formal security pact between America, Australia and New Zealand in the early 
1950s reflected a compromise. The United States offered a limited security guarantee and in return 
obtained Australian and New Zealand support for a lenient Japanese Peace Treaty, which 
complemented broader American ambitions to contain Communism. The antipodean powers had also 
benefited as ANZUS addressed concerns about the threat of a resurgent Japan that had deeply 
troubled policy-makers in Australia and New Zealand. Though the security apparatus of the alliance 
was limited, it established an important precedent of strategic cooperation across the Pacific. The 
ANZUS Treaty therefore benefited all of its members. 
The tripartite agreement could nevertheless discriminate in favor of Washington rather than 
those of Canberra or Wellington at times. Australian and New Zealand efforts to expand ANZUS’ 
remit to include broader strategic cooperation and planning failed in the subsequent years. In addition, 
Australia and New Zealand grudgingly surrendered older traditions of cooperation with the United 
Kingdom under the pressure of American threats of withdrawal. The creation of ANZUS certainly 
came at the expense of the interests of the United Kingdom. Many senior British figures were 
determined to make the Treaty as irrelevant as possible if they could not achieve membership.
224
 The 
longevity of the ANZUS Treaty highlights both the futility of such ambitions and the enduring 
success of U.S. diplomacy in the Southwest Pacific. 
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